A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions by Kirchkamp, O. et al.
  
 
A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions
Citation for published version (APA):
Kirchkamp, O., Reiss, J. P., & Sadrieh, A. (2006). A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions. (METEOR
research memorandum; No. 058). Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and
Economics.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2006
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
Oliver Kirchkamp, J. Philipp Reiss,  
Abdolkarim Sadrieh 
 
A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions 
 
RM/06/058 
 
 
JEL code : C92, D44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maastricht research school of Economics 
of TEchnology and ORganizations 
 
Universiteit Maastricht 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
P.O. Box 616 
NL - 6200 MD Maastricht 
 
phone : ++31 43 388 3830 
fax : ++31 43 388 4873 
 
 
 
 
 
A pure variation of risk in rst-price auctions
Oliver Kirchkampy, J. Philipp Reissz, Abdolkarim Sadriehx
December 03, 2006
Abstract
We introduce a new method of varying the risk that bidders face in rst-price private
value auctions. We nd that decreasing bidders risk signicantly reduces the degree of
overbidding relative to the risk-neutral Bayesian-Nash equilibrium prediction. This implies
that risk a¤ects bidding behavior as generally expected in auction theory. While resolving
a long-standing debate on the e¤ect of risk on auction behavior, our results give rise to a
new puzzle. As risk is diminished and overbidding decreases for most of the value range, a
signicant degree of underbidding sets in for very low values
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1 Introduction
For rst-price private value auctions, a plethora of experiments rmly established that there
is overbidding relative to the risk-neutral Bayesian-Nash equilibrium prediction (Kagel, 1995).
The leading explanation for this stylized fact received in the literature has been risk-aversion.
However, recent research demonstrates that risk-aversion is not a fully satisfactory explanation.
E.g., Cox, Smith, and Walker (1985) observe overbidding relative to the risk-neutral prediction
in an auction experiment employing a lottery payo¤ procedure designed to induce risk-averse
participants to submit risk-neutral bids. Kagel and Levin (1993) nd overbidding relative to the
risk-neutral prediction in third-price auction experiments where risk-averse bidders are predicted
to bid less than risk-neutral bidders. Kirchkamp and Reiss (2004) demonstrate that there is
substantial underbidding for small valuations if not precluded by the experimental design.
In this paper, we isolate the e¤ects of risk experienced by bidders in rst-price auction
experiments in the presence of strategic uncertainty. We modify risk in a natural way by varying
the number of income-relevant auctions that a participant plays with her bidding strategy in
each round.
We nd that the reduction of non-strategic risk moves observed bids closer to the risk-neutral
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium prediction. Overbidding is reduced substantially for high valuations.
However, we also nd that underbidding for low valuation is more pronounced and occurs more
often as the non-strategic risk is reduced.
2 First-price auctions with reduced risk
Consider a rst-price auction setting with private values that are identically and independently
distributed. In Bayesian-Nash equilibrium with a symmetric equilibrium bidding function, bid-
ders face uncertain income prospects due to uncertainty about competitorsprivate values. These
uncertain income prospects can be eliminated by averaging over an innite number of auctions,
where competitors private values are randomly determined over and over again. In such a
setting biddersequilibrium payo¤s are essentially deterministic and are equal to their expected
equilibrium payo¤s in the game played only once. When bidders use their bidding strategies
in a nite number of auctions, intermediate risk situations arise that lie between full risk in
a single auction and completely eliminated risk in innitely many auctions. Thus, the uncer-
tain income prospect can be gradually varied by varying the number of auctions in which each
bidding strategy is used.
To formalize the idea of gradually varying risk, suppose that it is common knowledge that
valuations x are uniformly and independently distributed over [0; 1]. Assume that utility func-
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tions have the form of u(x) = xr where r is the parameter measuring attitude towards risk.1 A
risk-neutral individual is described by r = 1, a risk-averse individual is characterized by r < 1.
To identify a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium we follow the standard approach and assume that there
is a symmetric and strictly increasing bidding function (x). In equilibrium, all bidders follow
bidding function (x). For the case of two bidders, we have to show that if bidder 2 follows
(x), then it is a best reply for bidder 1 to follow (x), too. Since (x) is strictly increasing,
we can identify for each bid b a valuation z such that b = (z). Bidder 1 wins the auction if
the other bidders valuation is smaller than z. The probability of this event is F (z) = z. If the
bidder plays n auctions with the same bidding function, the bidder wins k of these auctions with
probability
 
n
k
  F (z)k  [1  F (z)]n k. Bidder 1 maximizes
EU =
nX
k=0

n
k

 F (z)k  [1  F (z)]n k  u[k  (x  (z)]
For a symmetric equilibrium it is necessary that we have @EU=@z = 0 and z = x. Given constant
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Figure 1: Equilibrium bidding functions for a risk-averse bidder and di¤erent numbers of income-
relevant auctions
relative risk-aversion (u(x) = xr) it is straightforward to solve the corresponding di¤erential
equation for the case n = 1. With (0) = 0 we obtain the well-known equilibrium bidding
function (x) = x=(1 + r). For n = 2 it is possible to nd a closed-form solution. For n > 2
we have to resort to numerical approximations. Figure 1 depicts equilibrium bidding functions
for the case of a very risk-averse bidder with very low risk-tolerance r = 0:1 together with the
equilibrium bidding function for a risk-neutral bidder. The Figure illustrates that even in the
case of strong risk-aversion, the equilibrium bidding function approaches the equilibrium bidding
function of a risk-neutral bidder provided the number of played auctions is su¢ ciently high.
1Smith and Walker (1993) report that upward scaling the conversion rate at which laboratory currency is
converted into cash has an insignicant e¤ect on mean bid deviations from risk-neutral equilibrium bids. The
utilized utility function is the only functional form satisfying scale independence of payo¤s.
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3 Experimental design
We implemented the auction of a single object with two bidders in the rst-price sealed-bid
design without reserve price. Experiments were conducted in June 2005 at the Magdeburg
Experimental Laboratory (MaXLab) at the University of Magdeburg. A total of 214 subjects
participated in these experiments. All experiments were computerized with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 1999).
Figure 2: A typical input screen in the experiment (hypothetical data)
In the experiments we employed the strategy method to elicit bidding functions. We required
participants to specify their bids for six di¤erent valuations (50, 60, ..., 100). Bids for valuations
that are between those six valuations are obtained by linear interpolation. Figure 2 displays a
typical input screen that participants faced to submit their bidding strategy in each round. This
method to submit bidding strategies remained unchanged across all rounds and treatments.
Table 1: Treatment variables, treatment short-hands and number of independent observations
# of displayed auctions (F)
1 50
1 A1F1: 6 A1F50: 6
# of income-relevant auctions (A) 10 - A10F50: 6
50 - A50F50: 6
There were twelve rounds in each treatment. In each round each participant was randomly
matched with one other participant.
In order to explore the role of risk in rst-price auctions, we consider two treatment variables:
the number of income-relevant auctions (A) and the number of auctions whose outcome is
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displayed to participants as feedback (F). In each round a participant bids with her submitted
Figure 3: A typical feedback screen in the experiment (treatment A50F50, hypothetical data)
bidding strategy against her matched competitor in a xed number of auctions which was either
exogenously set to one or fty. For every single auction of each round, the valuation assigned
to each participant is independently drawn from a uniform distribution with domain [50; 100].
To determine the income of a participant in a given round, a subset of all displayed auctions is
selected at random and the corresponding auction income is added up. The number of selected
auctions that was relevant for income determination was either one, ten, or fty. If an auction
outcome was income-relevant, it was marked in the feedback screen with an asterisk.
Figure 3 illustrates a typical feedback screen for the treatment A50F50 where participants
played 50 di¤erent auctions per round which all were used to compute the round income. Anal-
ogously in the treatments with ten income-relevant auctions where 50 auctions were played, ten
auctions were marked. In the treatment with one income-relevant auction, 50 auctions were
played and 1 of them was marked.
Figure 4: A typical feedback screen in the experiment (treatment A1F1, hypothetical data)
Figure 4 shows a typical feedback screen for the treatment A1F1 where there was only a
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single played auction per round that was used to compute round income. Table 1 summarizes
the treatments that we investigated. It provides the shorthand-notation for each treatment and
the number of independent observations that we obtained.
4 Experimental results
4.1 Feedback e¤ect
In this subsection we investigate the e¤ect of increasing feedback on bidding behavior. Feedback
on outcomes is provided for 50 played auctions while a single one among them is selected at
random to completely determine round income. A priori one might expect that if increasing
feedback has any inuence on bidding behavior, then it would lead participants to bid closer
to the risk-neutral equilibrium; for evidence that auction feedback can impove the explanatory
power of theory to some limited extent see, e.g., Brosig and Reiss (2007).
For a rst impression whether multiple feedback has an e¤ect, Figure 5 depicts average
bidding functions for treatments A1F1 and A1F50.2 Average bids are provided in Table 2. If
feedback is introduced deviations from risk-neutral equilibrium are slightly reduced. Average
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Figure 5: Feedback e¤ect in the experiment if the number of auctions displayed increases
bids appear to be not strongly inuenced by feedback as Table 2 and Figure 5 suggest. To
see if there are statistical di¤erences between average bids for any given valuation, we employ
Mann-Whitney-U -tests where the results are provided in the last row of Table 2. We apply this
and all other tests (including the t-test) on averages on independent observation level. As can
2All gures, tables, and statistics provided in this section base on data that we obtained for rounds 7-12 since
bidding behavior appears to have stabilized for the second half of the experiment in terms of the number of bid
changes over time and the size of bid changes, cf. Kirchkamp and Reiss, 2004. However, if we make use of our full
data set and include data that we obtained for rounds 1-6 in our analyses, none of the conclusions are a¤ected.
6
Table 2: Average bids and average MSD by treatment
valuations 50 60 70 80 90 100 MSD
RNNE-bid 50 55 60 65 70 75
A1F1 45.5 54.9 64.7 73.9 83.4 92.6 125.3
A1F50 47.8 57.0 65.8 73.9 81.7 89.6 104.4
p-values :025 :0782 :2623 :5218 :3367 :0547 .337
The p-values are for two-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests.
be seen from the table, average bids di¤er signicantly only for the extreme valuations, i.e. 50,
60, and 100 ECU.
To see if feedback signicantly reduces deviations from risk-neutral equilibrium, we measure
the global distance between observed bids and the risk-neutral equilibrium bidding function
by computing the mean of squared deviations from risk-neutral bids (MSD) for each observed
bidding function
1
6
X
v2f50;60;70;80;90;100g
(bv   RNv )2.
Neither the t-test (two-tailed, p = 0:198 ) nor the Mann-Whitney-U -test (two-tailed, p = 0:337)
identies a signicant feedback e¤ect on mean squared deviations from equilibrium. This sug-
gests that multiple auction outcome feedback is, here, a secondary determinant of bidding behav-
ior. It follows that our results on risk variation given below do not stem from the introduction
of extensive feedback on auction outcomes.
4.2 Risk e¤ect
In the experiment we decrease the risk of bidders by increasing the number of auctions that a
bidder played with a submitted bidding function and whose outcomes are used to determine a
participants income. In our treatments A1F50, A10F50, and A50F50, each participant played
50 auctions with the same submitted bidding function per round. In treatment A1F50 (A10F50),
a single auction (ten auctions) out of these 50 auctions was (were) selected at random. The out-
come of these auctions fully determined the participants round income. In treatment A50F50,
all 50 auctions were selected and used to determine the participants round income. Evidently
risk is much smaller in the treatment where 50 di¤erent auctions determine the round income.
The left panel in Figure 6 depicts the average bidding function observed in treatments A1F50
and A50F50.3 Average bids for each treatment are listed in Table 3. The graph shows that in-
creasing the number of income-relevant auctions from 1 to 50 shifts the average bidding function
3The average bidding function for treatment A10F50 is not depicted to keep the gure clear-cut, but average
bids for this treatment are tabulated.
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Figure 6: Bidding strategy e¤ect in the experiment if the number of auctions played with a
single bidding strategy increases.
Left panel: Average bidding functions. Right panel: Cumulative frequencies for squared deviations from risk-
neutral equilibrium bidding.
strongly downward. Hence, bidding is less aggressive if risk is eliminated. Indeed, risk-averse
equilibrium bidding predicts smaller bids if risk is reduced. Comparing average bids separately
for each valuation observed in the A1F50 treatment to those in the A50F50 treatment using
non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U -tests leads to signicant di¤erences for each comparison (two-
tailed MWU-test, p < 0:0375).
To test the hypothesis that average bids for each valuation decrease as the number of
income-relevant auctions increases from 1 to 10 and further to 50, we employ the nonpara-
metric Jonckheere-Terpstra test with the null that the median of average bids in each of the
three treatments is the same and the alternative that medians are ordered. In addition to average
bids, the last row of Table 3 provides the corresponding test statistics. As can be seen from the
table, there is signicant evidence that average bids decrease as the number of income-relevant
auctions rises.4
A useful statistic to measure the distance between observed bidding functions and the risk-
neutral equilibrium prediction is the square of bidding deviations from risk-neutral equilibrium.
The right panel in Figure 6 depicts cumulative distributions of squared equilibrium deviations
averaged over participants and rounds in treatments A1F50, A10F50, and A50F50. It can be
4The test statistics for valuations 60 and 70 just miss the 5% level of signicance which precisely obtains for
J = 75.
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Table 3: Average bids by treatment
valuation 50 60 70 80 90 100 MSD
A1F50 47.8 57.0 65.7 73.9 81.7 89.6 104.4
A10F50 43.9 52.6 60.4 68.5 75.3 82.2 111.9
A50F50 45.1 54.2 62.0 68.6 75.7 82.0 56.9
J.-T
p-values
J = 82
p < :025
J = 74
p > :05
J = 74
p > :05
J = 91
p < :005
J = 82
p < :025
J = 89
p < :005
J = 88
p < :003
The table provides test statistics J for the Jonckheere-Terpstra test and information on one-tailed p-values.
seen that increasing the number of income-relevant auctions shifts the cumulated frequencies to
the left. A Jonckheere-Terpstra test conrms that a larger number of auctions decreases mean
squared deviations from equilibrium (one-tailed, J = 88, p < 0:005). In other words, reducing
risk brings observed bidding functions closer to the risk neutral equilibrium. Specically, the ex-
treme reduction of risk explains 45.5% of all squared deviations from the risk-neutral equilibrium
prediction that we observed in the bidding treatment A1F50 where standard risk prevailed.
4.3 Risk, overbidding and underbidding
In section 2 we have seen that an increase in the number of auctions reduces risk, and thus, the
di¤erence between the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and the risk-neutral Bayesian-Nash equilib-
rium. The experimental results from section 4.2 support this nding. The larger the number
of auctions, the smaller the deviation from the risk-neutral Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. A more
careful inspection of Figure 6 reveals that this nding holds in particular for high valuations. For
small valuations, however, playing more auctions actually increases the amount of underbidding,
and this increases the distance to risk-neutral bids.
Figure 7 shows cumulative frequencies of bids for valuations of 50 and 100. A t-test shows
that underbidding signicantly increases for a valuation of 50 (A1F50 vs. A50F50, one-tailed
t-test, p = 0:0037). Similarly overbidding signicantly decreases for a valuation of 100 (A1F50
vs. A50F50, one-tailed t-test, p = 0:0005). This nding is consistent with Kirchkamp and Reiss
(2004). They show that the presence of some boundedly rational bidders may yield underbidding
of all bidders, even the rational ones, for small valuations. In such a setting risk-averse bidders
still overbid for large valuations, though, overbidding decreases when risk is reduced. This is,
precisely, what we observe in Figures 6 and 7.
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Figure 7: Cumulative frequencies of bids for valuation 50 (left) and valuation 100 (right) by
treatment. The dotted line represents the risk-neutral equilibrium bid.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we set out to better understand the relation between risk and bidding behavior
in auctions. Is risk-aversion a factor that leads to bids in rst-price auctions higher than risk-
neutral equilibrium? To attack this question we introduce a novel design which allows us to
control and gradually change the amount of risk bidders experience in auctions.
The results that we present in section 4.1 conrm the internal validity of our design. In section
4.2 we have seen that by reducing risk we, indeed, reduce the distance between experimental
bids and the risk-neutral equilibrium bidding function. This nding supports the hypothesis
that overbidding in auctions is at least partially due to risk-aversion. Overall, risk-aversion can
explain 45.5% of squared deviations from risk-neutral equilibrium. A more detailed analysis in
section 4.3 reveals that bids in the experiment approach risk-neutral equilibrium bids only for
high valuations, i.e. valuations where overbidding is typically observed. For small valuations,
where we typically observe underbidding, we observe that eliminating risk actually increases the
distance of empirical bids from equilibrium bids, i.e. increases the amount of underbidding.
6 Appendix
6.1 Procedures
Participants were recruited by email and could register for the experiment on the internet. At the
beginning of the experiment participants drew balls from an urn to determine their allocation
to seats. Being seated participants then obtained written instructions. The experiment was
computerized and we used the software package z-Tree (Fischbacher (1999). After answering
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control questions on the screen participants entered the treatment described in the instructions.
After completing the treatment they answered a short questionnaire on the screen and were paid
in cash.
6.2 Instructions
We used identical instructions in treatments A1F50, A10F50, and A50F50. The instructions for
A1F1 were modied slightly to account for the fact that there is feedback on a single auction
as opposed to 50 auctions. The instructions are in German. In the following we provide a
translation.
6.2.1 General information
You are participating in a scientifc experiment that is sponsored by the state Saxony-Anhalt.
If you read the following instructions carefully then you canjdepending on your decision gain
a considerable amount of money. It is, hence, very important that you read the instructions
carefully.
The instructions that you have received are only for your private information. During the
experiment no communication is permitted. Whenever you have questions, please raise
your hand. We will then answer your question at your seat. Not following this rule leads to
exclusion from the the experiment and all payments.
During the experiment we are not talking about Euro, but about ECU (Experimental Cur-
rency Unit). Your entire income will rst be determined in ECU. The total amount of ECU that
you have obtained during the experiment will be converted into Euro at the end and paid to you
in cash. The conversion rate will be shown on your screen at the beginning of the experiment.
6.2.2 Information regarding the experiment
Today you are participating in an experiment on auctions. The experiment is divided into
separate rounds. We will conduct 12 rounds. In the following we explain what happens in each
round.
In each round you bid for an object that is being auctioned. Together with you another
participant is also bidding for the same object. Hence, in each round, there are two bidders.
In each round you will be allocated randomly to another participant for the auction. Your
co-bidder in the auction changes in every round. The bidder with the highest bid obtains the
object. If bids are the same the object is allocated randomly.
For the auctioned object you have a valuation in ECU. This valuation lies between 50 and
100 ECU and is determined randomly in each round. The range from 50 to 100 is shown to you
at the beginning of the experiment on the screen and is the same in each round. From this
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range you obtain in each round new and random valuations for the object. The other
bidder in the auction also has a valuation for the object. The valuation that the other bidder
attributes to the object is determined by the same rules as your valuation and changes in each
round, too. All possible valuations of the other bidder are also in the interval from 50 to 100
from which also your valuations are drawn. All valuations between 50 and 100 are equally likely.
Your valuations and those of the other player are determined independently. You will be told
your valuation in each round. You will not know the valuation of the other bidder.
Experimental procedure The experimental procedure is the same in each round and is
described in the following. Each round in the experiment has two stages.
1st Stage
In the rst stage of the experiment you see the following input screen:
- screenshot of input mode; omitted here -
At that stage you do not know your own valuation for the object in this round. On
the right side of the screen you are asked to enter a bid for six hypothetical valuations that
you might have for the object. These six hypothetical valuations are 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100
ECU. Your input into this table will be shown in the graph on the left side of the screen when
you click on "draw bids". In the graph the hypothetical valuation is shown on the horizontal
axis, the bids are shown on the vertical axis. Your input in the table is shown as six points
in the diagram. Neighbouring points are connected with a line automatically. These
lines determine your bid for all valuations between the six points for which you have made an
input. For the other bidder the screen in the rst stage looks the same. There are bids for six
hypothetical valuations, too. The other bidder can not see your input.
2nd Stage
The actual auction takes place in the second stage of each round. In each round we will
play [not in A1F1: not only] a single auction [not in A1F1: but fty auctions]. This is done as
follows:
[not in A1F1: Fifty times] a random valuation is determined that you have for the object.
Similarly for the other bidder [not in A1F1: fty random valuations are] [in in A1F1: one valua-
tion is] determined. [not in A1F1: The screen lists all auctions ordered by valuations.] You see
the following screen:
- screenshot feedback5; omitted here -
For [only in A1F1: your valuation] [not in A1F1: each of the fty valuations] the computer
determines your bid according to the graph from stage 1. If [in A1F1: your] [not in A1F1: a]
5The given screenshot for treatment A1F1 di¤ered from that for all other treatments only in the number of
displayed auctions. Drawn valuations, bids, and incomes were always replaced by ... in all instructions.
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valuation is precisely at 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, or 100 the computer takes the bid that you gave for
this valuation. If [in A1F1: your] [not in A1F1: a] valuation is between these points your bid
is determined according to the joining line. In the same way the [in A1F1: bid ] [not in A1F1:
bids] of the other bidder [in A1F1: is ] [not in A1F1: are] determined [not in A1F1: for his fty
valuations]. Your bid is compared with the one of the other bidder. The bidder with the higher
bid obtains the object. If you are the bidder with the higher bid, then your income from this
auction will be shown. If you are the bidder with the smaller bid, then a dot (.) will be shown
instead of the income.
Your income from the auction:
[not in A1F1: A xed number of auctions out of all 50 auctions will be randomly selected and
marked by an asterisk (*). The outcomes of these marked auctions determine your income in
this round. All auctions that are not marked do not change your account balance. The number
of marked auctions is the same in every round and will be shown on a screen at the start of the
experiment.]
[not in A1F1: For each of the randomly selected auctions that are marked by an asterisk (*)
the] [only in A1F1: The] following holds:
 The bidder with the higher bid obtains the valuation he had for the object in this auction
added to his account minus his bid for the object.
 The bidder with the smaller bid obtains no income from this auction.
You total income in a round is [not in A1F1: the sum of ] the ECU income from the
[not in A1F1: marked auctions] [in A1F1: auction] in this round where you have made
the higher bid.
This ends one round of the experiment and you see in the next round again the input screen
from stage 1. At the end of the experiment your total ECU income from all rounds will be
converted into Euro and paid to you in cash together with your Show-Up Fee of 3.00 Euro.
Please raise your hand if you have questions.
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